Ukraine retakes 176 sq km near Lyman

The counterattack, dubbed Vivaldi by Ukraine’s Third Army Corps, began in May but was disclosed only on Sept. 15, underscoring the operational secrecy Kyiv says helped it succeed. On Sept. 28, Lt. Gen. Andrii Biletsky said Ukrainian forces had retaken an additional 51 square kilometers in the third phase of the operation, taking the total recovered area to 176 square kilometers. Western analysts at the Modern War Institute and the Institute for the Study of War said the offensive cut off a Russian salient and disrupted plans to envelop the fortress belt.

What makes the operation notable is not just the ground recovered, but the way Ukraine achieved it. Ukrainian units described a mix of stealth concentration, drone reconnaissance, electronic warfare, air defense and deception designed to mask the main axis of attack. A captain with the callsign Akhmet said troops were moved into position around Drobysheve and the edge of Derylove as quietly as possible, allowing them to strike on schedule before Russian forces detected the buildup.

Ukraine also used ground drones in an expanded battlefield role. The Third Assault Brigade said it had adapted ground unmanned vehicles, or UGVs, with anti-tank weapons and explosives, then moved them deep into Russian lines using larger drones. The brigade said the tactic, nicknamed Griffin, has been used against Russian drone pilots, command posts and logistics routes, and in some cases forced Russian troops to abort attacks because they believed sabotage teams had infiltrated their rear areas. The unit said UGVs handled 80% of logistics tasks during the operation and 90% of casualty evacuation.

For investors and policymakers, the broader lesson is that the war is increasingly being shaped by cheap, adaptable systems rather than massed armor alone. Ukraine’s ability to use drones for logistics, deception and strikes suggests that battlefield advantage can still be created locally even when overall force ratios remain unfavorable. That argues against any reading of the war as frozen or settled.

Still, the counteroffensive does not change the larger balance in Donetsk. Kyiv itself has portrayed the result as one of its few offensive successes, not a turning point. Russia continues to attack the fortress belt from the south and may adapt by shifting pressure toward western supply lines, according to ISW. That keeps the operational risk high for Ukraine even as Vivaldi demonstrates that Moscow’s advances can be slowed and, in narrow sectors, reversed.

The next test is whether Kyiv can sustain this model of covert, drone-enabled maneuver while Russia adapts its own tactics. If Ukraine can keep interdiction pressure on Russian logistics and deny Moscow the ability to mass unobserved, it may blunt further gains around Lyman and elsewhere in Donetsk. If not, the Kremlin is likely to keep probing the same axis, with the fortress belt still the central prize.