Russia is liquidating gold from its reserves at the fastest pace seen since the 1998 financial crisis, a sign that falling oil and gas receipts are forcing the Kremlin to use one of its last hard-currency buffers to plug a widening budget deficit.
Russia gold reserves fall as budget deficit widens
The central bank has sold about 62 metric tons of bullion since December, trimming holdings to 72.8 million ounces, the lowest level since 2019, according to data cited by Moscow Times. September marked the tenth straight month of sales, with the year’s budget shortfall now projected at 7.3 trillion rubles, or more than 350 billion zlotys, roughly double the original estimate.
That matters because gold is not just another asset on Russia’s balance sheet. It is one of the few reserve holdings the state can convert without relying on Western financial infrastructure. The scale of the sales underscores how sanctions, weaker hydrocarbon revenue and persistent war spending are combining to squeeze public finances, even after years of attempts to insulate the economy from external pressure.
The comparison with 1998 is telling. The International Monetary Fund says the only faster recent sell-off came during Russia’s financial crisis and ruble collapse, when 118 tons were sold in three months. This year’s pace is less dramatic, but it is still unusual for a country that has spent years building itself up as one of the world’s biggest official gold holders.
For investors, the immediate implication is twofold. First, gold sales by a sovereign seller can add to supply at a time when bullion prices have been volatile and recently fell sharply. Second, Russia’s resort to reserves signals deeper fiscal stress, which can feed broader risk premia on Russian assets and keep attention fixed on Moscow’s ability to finance spending without sharper monetary or capital controls.
There is also a geopolitical angle. Chinese customs data show about 100 tons of gold shipments from Russia to Hong Kong between January and July, a sharp increase in exports after Moscow was cut off from the London market following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The data do not prove the gold came directly from central bank reserves, but the trade flow highlights how Russia has rerouted bullion away from Western hubs and toward China as sanctions redraw the global gold market.
The bull case for gold itself is that Russia’s selling is a forced flow rather than a sign of broader confidence in fiat assets; sovereign distress can coexist with long-term bullion demand. The bear case is that more reserve monetization could pressure prices in the near term, especially if other state holders move to raise cash amid fiscal strain.
For now, the message is clear: Russia’s gold stockpile is being drawn down to sustain the budget, not to strengthen it, and that leaves both the Kremlin and global bullion markets more exposed if oil and gas revenue remain weak.
| Entity | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| Russian government | ▲Near-term budget financing | ▼Reserve cushion |
| Gold buyers in China | ▲More supply access | ▼Higher price risk |
| Global gold market | ▲Trading liquidity | ▼Price stability |
| Russian exporters of oil and gas | ▲— | ▼Budget revenues, fiscal room |



